Docker Hub Spent Two Years Handing Out Its Users' Tokens to Strangers

Docker Hub quietly shipped a critical flaw (CVE-2026-105445, CVSS 9.4) that let anyone impersonate any other user at the registry level — and the trick wasn't a parser bug or a broken crypto primitive. It was a workflow. Hub has no way to move a repository between accounts, so the supported path is converting a personal account into an organization and naming an existing account as the new owner. From August 26, 2024 until Docker patched it on September 30, 2026, that conversion also re-assigned the converted account's personal access tokens to the named owner — changing the token's owner record while leaving the secret itself untouched, with no confirmation and no notification to the target. The attack reads like a checklist: create an account, mint a token on it, convert the account to an organization, name your victim as owner. The token now authenticates as them, and the attacker still holds the original secret.

Within the token's scope, that meant pulling, pushing, or deleting images in the victim's repositories and in every organization the victim could touch. The limits matter as much as the damage: the re-assigned token worked only at the registry, not in the web interface, and couldn't change a password, email, or two-factor settings. Docker says it deployed the fix less than four hours after the report landed, emailed the affected users on October 2 under the subject line "Docker Hub Vulnerability Identified & Resolved," reviewed every account conversion back to the date the flaw was introduced, and found no evidence anyone actually exploited it. The fix lives server-side, so if you weren't emailed, there's nothing to install and nothing to do. The researchers who found it, Peter Molnar and Krisztian Hozak, published a technical write-up, and the disclosure was coordinated rather than dropped.

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What keeps me thinking about this one is where the flaw lived. It sat in the least-used corner of an identity system — an account-conversion path most users touch once, if ever — and survived two years because nobody audits a feature nobody uses. Personal access tokens are the forgotten credentials of container workflows: minted during some 2023 CI setup, pasted into a runner's secrets, never looked at again. A registry trust model where tokens can be reassigned to a third party without their knowledge or consent is a design decision, not an implementation accident, and it took an outside researcher to notice. If your team runs private images on Hub, the honest question isn't whether this CVE affected you — Docker says most people weren't exposed. It's whether anyone on your team can say, today, how many active personal access tokens exist across your organization and what each one can still reach. I'd bet most teams can't, and that gap is the actual finding here.

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