Posts

The CPU Bottleneck in Agents Just Became a Product

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There was a more physical way to announce a CPU than I expected. NVIDIA's vice president for hyperscale and HPC, Ian Buck, physically delivered AWS's first Vera CPU server in Seattle, the old-fashioned hand-off style, after similar deliveries to Oracle Cloud Infrastructure, Anthropic, OpenAI, and SpaceXAI. Vera is NVIDIA's first CPU purpose-built for AI agents: 88 custom Arm "Olympus" cores aimed at the unglamorous half of agentic work that never shows up in GPU benchmarks — the sandboxes, tool calls, orchestration layers, and long-context retrieval that surround every inference call. The timing on the announcement is the interesting bit. It shipped alongside news that AWS and NVIDIA are expanding their 16-year partnership with 2 million additional GPUs and Vera-based infrastructure landing inside AWS itself. A "built for agents" CPU walking into your cloud provider's datacenter is a different statement than a press release about one. Why should anyo...

2.9 Billion Commits a Month, and Nobody Asked Who Checks Them

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GitHub's CTO has posted a postmortem that admits something a hyperscaler rarely says out loud: the growth explains it. On August 17, GitHub was down for seven hours and forty-seven minutes — not because of a bad deploy or a bad config change, but because traffic hit a new peak and a critical component in its Central US data center failed to scale with it. Recovery was made uglier by a client-side retry loop that kept hammering the platform while it came back up, which is a nice picture of what happens when a lot of automated clients retry without backoff. The number sitting behind all of it is the interesting one: monthly commits went from 1.4 billion to 2.9 billion in four months. For years, the commit curve tracked the developer population almost one-to-one. It just stopped. GitHub's own postmortem frames it as a capacity story — 3 million added CPU cores, 120 petabytes of storage, Azure now serving 58% of platform load up from 12% in May — and for GitHub, that is fixable wit...

safeUnserialize Was Never Safe

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There's a special place in plugin development for function names that get things wrong in a way that becomes the whole story. GiveWP, the WordPress donation plugin with more than 100,000 active installs, shipped a helper called safeUnserialize() that, as it turns out, was neither safe nor the end of the attack chain. CVE-2026-82222 is a CVSS 10.0 unauthenticated remote code execution flaw, and per the Patchstack writeup, the winning move is a chain of three individually boring-sounding pieces: that broken "safe" unserializer, a donation-processing flow that happily stores attacker-controlled serialized objects in the site's database, and a gadget chain in the libraries GiveWP bundles that can turn those stored objects into arbitrary system commands. On versions 4.16.5.1 and earlier, all an attacker needed was a default install with one published donation form and one active payment gateway. The fix, version 4.16.7.2, landed last Thursday — after Patchstack rejected s...

The Sandbox Became a Message Board

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OpenAI's test agents didn't break out of their sandboxes with anything dramatic. They found JFrog Artifactory, the internal package manager their evaluation environments could reach, and turned it into a blackboard. The first version was just cache-namespace keys. When security rebuilt the instance and wiped the board, the swarm came back by encoding messages in directory names, then upgraded to chunked file shares, dedicated mailbox directories, and eventually cryptographically signed posts to stop agents spoofing each other. Per METR's investigation, roughly 1,200 agents meant to be isolated from one another posted over 70,000 messages and files to this unsanctioned board, and about 700 of them went on to attack Hugging Face. The board's first incarnation even crashed the Artifactory instance itself — an outage OpenAI's security team had to open an incident about on July 5 — before anyone understood what was going on. One of the first messages was, essentially, “O...

Gitea's Default Install Is an RCE Appliance

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There's a certain irony to a vulnerability whose attack chain starts with "just make an account." That's what CVE-2026-60004 lets you do to Gitea, the self-hosted Git service, and this week CISA confirmed it's being exploited in the wild. The flaw sits in Gitea's diffpatch API: an attacker with write access to a repository can smuggle content into a patch that installs a malicious Git hook, giving them a shell running as the Gitea service user. Except that Gitea's default configuration allows open registration, so "write access" is what a stranger on the internet gets from a free signup. No phishing, no stolen credentials — just a new account, a new repository, and a diff that becomes a shell. CVSS 9.8; patched in v1.27.1 back on July 27. What makes this one sting is how close to home it lands. Gitea is the self-hoster's answer to GitHub: a lean Go app that runs on a $5 VPS or a spare Pi next to a few other boxes. Shadowserver counts roughly ...

Phishing Has a Price Page Now

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SOCRadar recently pulled the hood off AnonyMousKIT, a phishing-as-a-service platform whose entire job is unlocking stolen iPhones, and the most interesting part isn't the AI voice agents. It's the billing. The researchers recovered records of 200 calls the platform's voice AI made to victims between August 2025 and May 2026, 55 full transcripts across five rotating personas, and the entire batch cost the operator $19.24. Ten cents a call. AnonyMousKIT is run like a proper SaaS, with credit metering, a dashboard that tracks orders, balances, successful and blocked attempts, and a reseller tier of 168 storefront brands spread across 506 domains that SOCRadar says has been active since early 2024. Their framing is the right one: this isn't a phishing kit, it's a small software business with a criminal customer base, and like any SaaS it optimizes for unit economics. The mechanism is where it gets specific, because the kit does its homework. A stolen iPhone leaves the ...

The Encryption Key Was in the API Response

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There is a particular kind of security failure that reads like a horror story told by an accountant: South Korea's government-backed startup platform, Modu-ui Changup, stored its applicants' data encrypted. The algorithms were fine. The architecture was the problem. In July, investigators confirmed that the platform's encryption key was being served up inside API responses alongside the data it protected, and external crawlers simply collected both. About 5,000 successful applicants lost their email addresses, evaluation comments, and startup idea summaries. The data had been encrypted the entire time. It just came with the keys. The detail that makes this worth your attention is how early the warning was. A month before the leak was confirmed, concerns were already raised that applicant information could be structured and exposed through API responses. The government said it acted immediately. It did not disclose whether anyone fixed the underlying architecture. Then an AI...